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Coal is not only the base of our civilization and a key to our
continued high standard of living but it is also playing a leading
part in the recovery of Europe and other backward nations of the
world. Our dependency upon coal as a basic source of energy is grow-
ing greater and greater every day. Some day atomic power may be our
principal source of energy b.lt the list of technical obstacles that
block the way for widespread and commercia.l use of atomic energy is
a long one. Unlike its competitors, such as petroleum and natural
gas, the reserves of which are extremely limited, the reserves of
coal are ample for centuries to come. In fact as far as science
knows today, excluding atomic power elements, 95.5 percent of the
United States fuel resources still in the ground consists of coal.
It is easy to realize, with the above facts in mind, how much the
industrial civilization of the United States depends on an uninter-
rupted and t cheap I supply of coal.
The purpose of this work is to examine the role of Unionism on
the cost of coal. Since the objectives of unions are (1) increased
wages, (2) progressive decrease of working hours, (3) safe working
conditions, and (4) insistence of union shop and regulations regard-
(1)
ing apprenticeship and helpers, they might force us to conclude
(1) Millis, Harry A., and Montgomery, Royal E., Organized Labor.
New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1945. pp.389-442.
or at least observe with a prejudice that the existence of unions and
industry wide collective bargaining stand in the way of a cheap supply
2.
(2)
of coal and thus delay the corni'orts that are attainable through
-- --~--_._-------------~--~~-~~~
(2) Coal, as mentioned in this investigation, means all Bituminous
Coal produced in the United states except Pennsylvania Anthra-
cite. Unless specified tonnages are expressed in short tons of
2000 pounds.
------,----------~---------._-------
industrial progress whose foundation rests on an abundant and cheap
supply of coal.
Although labor plays an important part in t he production costs
it is well to realize that other factors have a potent influence on
the determination of total costs. They are (1) the abundance and ac-
cessability of coal deposits and the relative ease with which mmes
may be opened and reopened are ever present inducement s to the coal
lands to begin production at the first propitious opportunity, (2)
the cost of holding undeveloped coal lands (taxes, and interest char-
ges, as well as cost of supervision are continuously recurring items
of expense and. since there is no inccme until coal is marketed, these
resources tend to be developed as. soon as favorable opportunities pre-
sent themselves), (3) decentralization and the wide geographic distri-
bution of the mines, (4) highly centralized character of the industry's
capital demand, (5) the great time required to develop new mine pro-
perties (takes two or three or even longer years), (6) increase in mech-
anization, (7) character and seasonability of demand, (8) decline in
the rate of growth of important consurning industries, (9) competition
(3 )
frcm other sources of energy, and (10) economies in the use of coal.
(J) Report of the Committee on Prices in the Bituminous Coal Indus-
try prepared for the Conference on Price Research. National Bur-
eau of conomic Rese ch, 1938. PP. 12-21.
(4)
Some men like Fred W. Whiteside are of the opinion "that the
present high price of coal is due to no other agency than the high
wages paid the miners and the dominating practices of those individ-
uals who govern the coal miner! s unions."
(4) Secretary Treasurer, The Rocky Mountain Coal Mining Institute,
Denver, Colorado; Personal communication.
(5)
A more moderate trend of thought is represented by Degen Boyd
(5) Arkansas Oklahoma Coal Operators Association .. Fort Smith, Arkan-
sas. Personal Communication.
who writes that "unionism itself has not caused cost increases, but
rather that the evils that seem to BO with unionism has caused the
increase."
How much of the foregoing conclusions are valid? It is the pur-
pose of this work to measure the validity and truth of the foregoing
statements. In conformity with Lord Kelvin's dictum that "m en you
measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers you
know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you
cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and un-
satisfactory kind"l, an exhaustive plan will be followed before reach-
ing a balanced conclusion.
The scope of this work is first, to develop an historical per-
spective through a criticA.l survey of the growth of unionism and sub-
sequently to analyse the effects the attendants of unionism. (higher
wages, shorter working hours f and better working conditions that re-
sult in greater safety) has had on the production costs of bituminous
4.
coal. "It is difficult to determine what portion of these benefits
accruing to the bituminous coal worker is due to unionism per se and
what portion would have taken place even though no unions had. existed.
The improved conditions cannot all be attributed to the existence or(6)
the influence of unions. lI
(6) Dr. Walter L. Slifer, Chief, Research and Statistical Section,
National Coal Association. Personal Communication.
Thus a dead. end is reached, as in any S) cial engineering study,
when many intangibles have to be evaluated. The cont radictory and
sometimes ilIDlleasurable nature of the various point s of view shows
that any study of this kind cannot be summarized with a rigorous con-
elusion and by its nature ought to be largely functional rather than
essentially evaluative. However a conscientious evaluation of the
trends which are based on facts obtained by empirical research will
be made and an interpretation of their positive and negative roles
will be attempted.
Concerning the importance of undertaking this project the writer(7)
wishes to cite the remark made by W. Massey Foley. GEneral Counsel
(7) Personal Communica.tion.
of Appalachian Coals, Inc., that "there could hardly be a more impor-
tant or more timely one. II
Most of the published works on I Unionism and Coal Industryl meas-
ure the benefits gained by the worker because of unionism, and within
the knowledge of the writer, no correlated study has been made 'lmtil
now- to interpret the effect of unionism on the cost of coal. Hence
this study.
Review of Literature
Many studies are available for the student who wants to inves-
tigate the working of collective bargaining and unionism.
(1)
John Mitchell is probably the first to attempt a systanatic
(1) Mitchell, John. Organized Labor. Philadelphia: American Book
and Bible House, 1903. PP. 435.
and modern treatise on organized labor. His book sets forth many
important conditions and assumptions upon the basis of which the
union organizes, seeks recognition at the hands of employers, and
proceeds in support of its interest in wages, hours t and working
conditions.
During the twenties, when part of the bituminous coal industry
was unionized, great confusion prevailed and consequently the United
states Government set up a Coal Commission to investigate this ttrou-
bled industry'. The members of the Coal Conunission submitted their
findings and set out their conclusions on how coal is mined, costs,
prices, and profit 5, miner t swages, hours and earnings, and causes
(2)
of strikes.
(2) Hunt, E. Eo, Tryon, F o Go, and Willits, J. Ho, What the Coal
Commission Found. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Co.,
1925. PP. 416.
When the National Recovery Administration was functioning they
brought forth a book critically ex:amining the corrlitions that existed
(3)
before and under the Coal Code. The chapter on labor prepared by
6.
----_._- ~.~._--------_._---._------
(3) Berquist, F. E., and associates, Economic Survey of the Bitum-
inous Coal Industry under Free Competition and Code Regulation.
Office of NRA, Division of Review. 1936. PP. 713.
Louis Levine and Charles E. Persons is especially very infor ative and
sheds much light on the condition of the industry during the early
years of this centuryo
Much information on the economic status of the coal miner and(4)
price of coal is found in the publica.tion 'The Price of Coal'.
(4) The Price of Coal. The nnals of the American Academy of Pol-
itical and Social Sciences, Volume CXI. Philadelphia. 1924.
PP. 3£rl.
Dr. Waldo E. Fisher has contributed some of the ou:t.stand·ing
studies in the field of collective bargaining in the bituminous coal
(5)
industry 0
(5) Fisher, W. E., Economic Consequences in the Seven Hour Day and
Wage Changes in the Bituminous Coal Industry. Philadel hia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939. PP. 130.
Fisher, W. E., Collective Eargaining in the Bituminous Coal
Industry. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948.
PP. 43.
How Collective Bargaining Works. (Chapter 5, Bituminous
Coal). New York: Twentieth Century Fund Inc., 1942. PP. 986.
Russell Sage Foundation, with Mary Van Kleeck as the Director
of its Department of Industrial Studies, have brought forth many val-
(6)
uable books.
(6) Van Kleeck, Mary, Miners and Management. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1934. w. 391.
Bloch, Louis, Labor Agreements in Coal Mines. New York: Rus-
sell Sa e Foundation, 1931. PP. 513
7.
Wieck, E. A., The American Miners' Association. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1940. PP. 330.
Wieck, E. A., The Miner's Case and the Public Interest.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947. PP. 92.
Modern tren s in organized labor is adequately explained by Mil-
(7)
lis and Montgomery.
_. ,0 __, - _ ••__ •• 0 _
(7) Millis, H. A., and Montgomery, R. E., ,2£. £!!:..
A good account of the United Mine Workers with thumb nail sket-
ches of many personalities in that organization is included in a pub-
(8)
lication by Mcdonald and LYnch.
(8) Mcdonald, D. J., and ~ch, E. A., Coal and Unionism. Indianapo-
lis: Cornelius Printing Co., 1939. PP. 225.
Many co t figures regardiIlg the i.n:iustry has recent ly been pub-
(9)
lished by the Southern Coal Producers Association.
Facts Concerning Employee's Earnings, Cost, etc.,
SCPA, 1944 - 48, (Vols. Ito V).
Charleston:
Many other bulletins and pamphlets published by the Bureau of
Mines and the Bureau of Labor Statistics help a 'WOrker in this field.
It was not possible to obtain accurate figures on union membership
and related figures as "they are not complete and, therefore, would(10)
be of little significance in your study. II




"Collective bargain· g is a device by which l-,'Orkers seek to
minimize insecurity and inequality of treatment and to maximize
earnings and opportunity. Its role varies in importance from plant
to plant and from industry to industry. Its value varies directly
with the degree of disorganization in t e industry. It is needed
most where competition is ruinous, profits are low, price wars are
prevalent, wages have no floor, hours no ceiling, and working condi-
tiona no minimum standards. It was because these comitions pre-
vailed in the Bituminous Coal Industry throughout so much of its
history that labor organizations appeared so early and became a long
(1)
established institution in a large portion of the industry."
(1) Fisher, W. E., Collective Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal In-
dustry. op. cit. J P. 2.
------------------------------,-
1. Before IB98;.
Unionism in the industry first appeared midway in the nineteenth
century. Irish, Welsh, English, and Scotch men who had been active
in the miners t unions in the British Isles were not slow to preach
the gospel of unionism to the coal miners. In IB49 local. coal unions
came into existence in some isolated places, great efforts for their
organization having been taken by John Bates. He dEmanded higher
wages and better \to'Orking coniitions for the miners. A strike ensued
(2)
but it proved unsuccessful. However, follovd.ng this lead many
(2) Mcdonald, D. J., and Lynch, E. A., ~. ~., P. 16.
9.
unions were formed in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania reg-
ions. Men like Thomas Lloyd and Daniel eaver were constantly preach-
ing the benefits of unionism, and urged the miners to rally around
the standards of labor unions. This bore fruit on January 28, 1861,
when the Illinois and Missouri miners established the American Miners
Association, the first attempt to form a national union in this indus-
(3)
try. The association resolved to send organizers to adjacent coal
(3) How Collective Bargaining Works. ~. cit., PP. 230 - 231.
fields and publish a newspaper, 1 eakly Miner'. As this was during
the Civil War, the demand for coal was great and prices went up. The
association demanded and obtained higher and higher wages for the
miners. Soon after the Civil War ended, the demand for jobs rose in
direct proportion tot he slackening of the need for coal J and the seeds
of a depre sion were sown. Wage cuts followed the post war cbflation
and bitter and unsuccessful strikes in 1867 and 1868 marked the dis-
appearance of the association.
Soft coal miners organized local unions in Illinois, Indiana,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Michigan, Kentucky, ani West Virginia in the
next fifteen years. At the same time they sought state legislation
for horter hours and safer working corrlitions and were partially suc-
cassful in Ohio and Pennsylvania. J01'1J1 Siney, President of tt'1e vJork-
ingmen's Benevolent Society, studied the economics of the coal inius-
try and did much to promote he lthy unionism in this period. He headed
a delegation of five miners which negotiated the first wage agreement
on record. with an association of coal operators in Pottsville, Penn 0 ,
on Juq 29, IS70. He called a convention of all local unions and
associations ~f coal miners. Out of this emerged, on October 1$73,
the Miners l National Association of the United states of America.
This also did not last very long and Siney I sorrowfully locked the
door of their national office in Cleveland, Ohio, and went home(4)
never to return, in 1$76.' The 1$73 depression and the conse-
-------._-------~--
(4) McDonald, D. J., and 4mch, E. A. t .2.E.. ill. P. 20.
quent wage cuts ..rhich led to strikes and discharge of union members
and the employment of strike breakers caused the dissolution of the
association. HO''1ever, in 1$75, ,men it was on the peak of power,
it counted 35,354 members in twelve states ani the Indian territory.
Delegates and local union members from Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland, under the guidance of John McBride assembled in Pittsburgh
on May 1.5, 18S3 t and formed a national union kno'Wn as the Amalga-
(5)
mated Association of the Miners of the United States. ed-
(5) McDonald, D. J. t and I~rnch, E. A., ~. cit. p.20
iately after, it found itself enmeshed in a bitter strike in the
Hocking Valley t Ohio. Throughout the year 1S84 the struggle aga.inst
wage cuts continued until "on a gloomy March day in 1885 the strike
was declared at an end and the spectre of defeat again settled on
(6)
the shoulders of the miners."
(6) McDonald, D. J., and Lynch, E. A., OPe cit. p.20.
"Determination ro se frellt the gray ashes of a lost cause." Des-
pite the many difficulties the miners of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio t
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, IOvIa, and Kansas fonned the National
Federation of Miners and Mine Workers in 1885, and named Chris
Evans, their executive secretary. The convention passed a resolu-
tion instructing their office bearers to invite the coal operators
of America to meet them in joint conference for th:l purpose of neg-
otiating a wage agreement. An agreement wi. th the coal operators
of America, the first interstate wage contract in history, was
signed after s orne delay in Coltunbus, Ohio, on February 24, 1886.
Basic wages were established for Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Ill-
inois, lotia, and West Virginia. T~ reasons that goaded the oper-
ators to accept the wage contract were many. Especially after 1878
there was a general decline in wholesale prices accompanyingy
shutdovrns.There were temporary interruptions to the general down-
ward trend in 1879, 1881, and 1887. During these years occurred the
depression of 1883-85. the recession of 1888 and 1890, and the four
years of business stagnation that followed the panic of 1893. Dur-
ing this time soft coal production increased by leaps and bounds
and under the most adverse conditions. The industry was in a state
of abnormal over-production far in excess of demand. An endless
succession of price wars, wage reductions with irregular operation,
muoh unemployment, and low hourly earnings characterized this period.
Such conditions were v ry fertile for union activity but already
immigrants from south and central Europe entered the irxlustry in
large numbers and undermined the solidarity of the English speaking
workers. The Knights of Labor stepped in and began to organize
the coal industry and negotiated vrage contracts. But the wage con-
tract was not destined to live long because man.y operators did not
cooperate. Much that happened during these years were not beneficial.
ther to th min rs or operators.
In 1888, seemingly for no particular reason the national feder-
ation decided to call itself the National Progressive Union of Miners
and Mine Laborers and affiliated itself with the infant American Fed-
eration of Labor under the presidency of Samuel Gompers.
Gompers had worked hard to advance his principles of trade lmion-
ism as opposed to the industrial union philosophy of the Knights of
Labor. The Knights of Labor, which as late as 1888 had enrolled the
majority of coal miners, were very uncooperative, and in fact some-
times \U1dercut existing union scales to secure recognition of its
own organization. Having lost heavily in the collapse of the inter-
state agreement, it Bought a conciliation with the national federation.
Realizing the need f or a solid labor front J in September 1889 J the
National District ssembly 135 of the Knigj'lts of Labor (the miners
division) and the National Progressive Union decided that time had
come to end their warfare. They assembled in Colwnbus J Ohio, and,
on January 1890, formed the United Mine lrlorkers of America with John
B. Rae as president. This new union preserved the essential features
of both the organizations. This condition continued 'lUltil 1898 'When
the organization representing the Knights of Labor in the Bituminous
Qoal Industry was dissolved. The United Mine orkers reorganized and
(7)
soon dontinated the industry.
(7) How Collective Bargaining Works, 2,£. ill., p. 236.
The in.itial years for this union were very disheartening. It
failed to reestablish the interstate agreement. Many of its strikes
for higher wages and shorter hours proved unsuccessful and consequently
13.
discredited the organization with both operators and miners. Condi-
tions were bad during the depression of 1893-98. In sane places coal
was sold for 25 cents per ton. Drastic price reduction compelled
operators to sell their coal far less than their cost of production.
The national union sought to protect the miners t falling standard of
living by a series of strikes. Later it called. out miners to reduce
the coal surplus so that with higher prices the operators could pay
more wages. In the spring of 1894, 125,000 miners called a strike.
This spread to adjacent areas. The operators conferred and a eed
to postpone a pending wage reduction and brought temporary adoption
of the agreed wage scales at some mines.
Further attempts to reestablish the interstate agreement failed
and the union which now commanded th faith of miners ordered a strike
in J~ 1897 to bring back interstate agreements. 150,000 miners res-
ponded. Thi strike lasted 12 weeks. The operators realized that
frequent wa e cuts usually led to corresponding reductions in price
with competition just as ruthless as before. The union promised to
organize and bring under contract the non-union mines south of the
Ohio River. The central competitive field was negotiated. The oper-
a.tors of Illinois. Indiana. Ohio. and Western Pennsylvania, after con-
siderable negotiati.ons, established. in 1898 the basic eight hour day,
uniform wage scale for d~en and tonnage rates a s basic points in
each area and for the men who actually mined the coal. As one official
expressed it" "the prime goal sought, at least in theory, was uniform
costs in fields with common markets, and to hold selling prices up to
(8)
reasonable rates or levels'! The central competitive field agree-
(8) How Collective Bargaining Works, op, cit., p, 238.
roent remained in effect for 29 years.
Thus this period 1ll1til 1898 can be characterized as th e struggle
for the establishment of unionism, No significant success can be
ascribed and the tw events of importance were the founding of the UMW
of A and the Central Competitive Field agreement which was negotiated
in 1898,
2, 1898 - 1927,
(a) Central Competitive Field.
Before 1904, wage agreements were made annually; from 1904 to
1916 biennially; and thereafter, until the collapse of the central
competitive field compacil in 1926, for periods ranging from seven
mcnths to three years. The attitude of the miners and operators to-
wards each other was very friendly. The general 5Y tem adopted was
one of conciliation an:i collective bargaining and not a systan of arbi-
tration, The driving force behind th~ negotiations was the desire to
keep the mines running,
The restriction of its jurisdiction to basic points and to factors
that affected the composite position. of the member fields greatly sim-
plified the job of interstate conferences,
After the interstate agreement of 1898, except when the miners
took a five percent reduction in 1904 under the advice of John Mitchell,
wage rates gradually moved. upward, In almost all places the eight-
hour day was recognized. The Ir1ll1 of mine! basis of p~ment was adopted
in 1916 in the central field and rem::lved a major source of irritation.
15.
Most stoppages, during this period. gre'Yl out of biennial wage
contract negotiations and were suspensions awaiting a new contract
rather than an actual strike. The suspensions which occurred in the
even years when wage contracts expired from 1900 to 1912 were all sim-
ilar in character. Even under 'l!thl!' conditicns like the dispute of
1910, which arose "men the miners asked for a t en cent increase per
ton for tonnage rates, spot delivery prices rarely rose above 25 to
50 cents per ton. The decline in business a ctivity of 1913 effected
the coal industry unfavorably.
The World War saved the industry from going Ion the rocks l and
from then on miners negotiated and got successive wage increases.
The passage of the Liver Act on August 10. 1917, gave the President
powers to fix prices, take over ;md operate p1ahts and maintain con-
trol over production, distribution. and consumpt.ion of necessities.
Even more significant was the creation of the Fuel Administraticn on
August 13. 1917. Stabilization in labor conditions in 1918 was greatly
influenced by the Government Fuel Administrator by anticipating and
adjusting grievances. In August J 1918, the miners appealed directly
to the Fuel Administrator for an increase in wages because of the con-
tinued rise in the cost of living. This was denied on the grounds
Ithat dealing w.i.th wages in each industry separately is inevitably
(9)
and constantly to increase the cost of living.' Dissatisfaction
(9) Berquist, F.E., and associates, ,2E. ill.• p. 162.
was evident azoong the miners when war ended in 1919 and the Fuel Admin-
istration was abolished. They demanded, in the Ul-lW convention of Sep-
tember 1919, (1) a 60% increase in tonnage and yardage rates; (2) a six
16.
hour day and a five day week for day men; (3) time and a half for over-
time and doub1etime for sundays ani holidays; (4) abolition of t he pen-
alty clause; (5) no sectional settlEments; (6) all new contracts should
expire on the same date. The operators opposed, stating that: (1) pro-
duction costs were already exeessive; (2) decrease in working time
would cut production and further increase costs; and (3) strike threats
were being used as a weapon to force a new agreement. No agreement
was reached at the joint conference on October 9, 1919, and the UMW
issued a strike call to take effect November 1. The Government inter-
vened on the strength of the Liver Act. Acting under the decision of
Justice A. B. Anderson of the Federal Court, the 001 issued cancella-
tion orders but the strike preparation went ahead. The industrial
di pute involved 418,279 men or 67.2% of the total number employed in
the industry and at its peak tied up 71% of the coal prod~ing capacity.
The strike was very effective and President Wilson issued a public
statement on December 6, 1919 urging strike settlement. After a con-
ference with Government officials, the labor representatives announced
t.hat miners would return to work with a 14% wage increase. The Govern-
ment appointed a Bituminous Coal Commission on December 19, 1919 to
report on the conditions of the industry. This report was' to be ac-
cepted as a basis of I;l. new wage agreement.
The Commission reported its findings on March 10, 1920, an a
joint conference held in New York fonnulated an interstate agreement
incorporating the Comnission1 s recommendations. Despite the joint
agreement, considera.ble dissatisfaction prevailed, 'DJBnY operators,
especially those of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, declined to abide by
the agreement and many strikes resulted. Another joint meeting was
17.
held in Cleveland and it adjourned without agreement. The UMW' auth-
orized separate agreement s •
Depressed economic conditions following the boom of war prosper-
ity resulted in two trends. (1) Operators l demands for wage agree-
ments revision with Union refusal, and (2) in many areas agreements
with UM'l were broken. John L. Lewis, who was then President of the
UM'l, announced a policy of t no wage reduction and no step backward. I
Apart from this, competition from the non-union South was increas'ng.
In many places without union sanction, wage levels reverted to the
1919 scale. This led to many strikes and much violence. The oper-
ators refused to attend a joint conference convened at Pittsburgh
in January 1922. This was followed by a strike calIon March 20, to
be effective March 31. The s trike was one of the greatest in history
and although many southern areas did not participate ful13r, many
non-union northern areas joined in. The transportation situation in
1922 added greatly to the effectiveness of the strike. Fear of coal
shortage and the violence which attended the strike led the Govern-
ment to intervene. The w:>rkers returned to work and the Union made
it possible for any group or individual operator to enter into agree-
ment s. The Central Field could no longer 1J>-e regarded as a basic unit.
A wage contract was signed which provided for the continuation of the
wage rates in the previous agreement until 1924.
A conference wit the northern operators was held at Jackson-
ville J Florida, and this rene\tTed the previously exi ting ge rates
until March 31, 1927. This was the IJacksonville greement l • Soon
afterwards non-union operators reduced the rates first to those of
1919 and then to 1917 or lower. This madethe position of union oper-
ators very unsatisfactory and many union fields \-.rere shut down. In
1927 the miners and operators met in joint conference. For the miners
the time was inopportune because coal prices and wages in important
non-union districts were moving downward. The operators demanded a
twage scale that would be continuously competitive with the southern
(10)
area and urged a sliding scale. r The union representatives re-
(10) How Collective Bargaining Works, QE• .E!., P. 261.
---------~---_._------.~-- --.--~------
jected this and proposed rene,..al of t he present scale for two years
and interim meetings at which the joint cohference could discuss the
industry's problems and attempt to obtain stabilizing legislation.
When operators refused the confreres deadlocked. A general strike
involving about 175,000 men in mine states was called on April 1, 1928.
Despite the efforts of Secretary of Labor, Davis, and the Governors
of the states involved, no basis for a general strike settlement was
reached. On July 18, 1928, the UMW cancelled the strike order and
instructed the district leaders to call the men to return to \'JOrk on
the best terms they could get.
(b) Outside the Central Competitive Field.
The central field was the union I s stronghold. It also represen-
ted a significant percentage of the country's coal production. But
gradually it s importance wan d and the southern coal min s incr ased
in prominence, most of which were out side the dominating innuence of
the Union. However, a second center of unionism was the Soi.lthwestern
Interstate Field lying between Iowa and North Texas and cCllsisting of
Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma. Their bargaining system
resembled those of the central field. Other areas in which collective
19
bargaining has had a long history are Central Pennspvania, Montana,
Michigan, Washington, Western Kentucky, and Wyoming. Certain portions
of Alabama, and 'West Virginia were also under ccntract for varying
periods. Although they were district entities, the outlying union
fields were largely governed by events in the central field. Their
joint ccn.ferences were usually after the central field agreement had
been signed.
In the late twenties union organizers penetrated Al bama, West Vir-
ginia, and SUbsequently Kentucky and Tennessee. After more than 25
years of almost continuous strife the southern coal fields were still
unorganized. 'This bitter struggle supplies same of the blackest pages
(11)
in the history of American industrial relations.' Bot the oper-
(11) How Collective Bargaining Works. .2.£. ill., P. 264.
ators and the mions spent vast sums of money in the fight for supre-
macy and resorted to extreme measures to gain their ends. The Union
made many gains during the orld War, only to lose them during the
post war depression.
The importance of the s Quthern coal fields ws rapidly increas-
ing so that by 1925 only 40% of the coal was produce under union con-
tracts.
This period in the grovrth of unionism is well described by Tryon,
F. G., as a growth with a Icentral mass of mion territory surrounded
(12)
by a broken crescent of non-unionism.'
(12) The Price of Coal, ,2E. ill.• P. 86.
------------------------.__._~~-------
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3, 1927 - 1933.
The collapse of interstate agreement was the signal for bit-
tel" struggle for markets. The price war llegan in e l"nest and wages
were slashed both in the North and South. Throughout the industry,
except for agreements with the individual or small group of operators,
wages and other terms of employment '\!\ere negotiated through individual
bargaining or employee representation plans or company unions.
An important segment of the bituminou field had come under
the financial control of steel, railroad, and automobile companies
which mined directly for their 0'\'11 use. These companies took advan-
tage of the situation presented by the weakness of unions, proclaimed
an open shop policy in the captive mines and thus tore from the union r 8
grasp another area of coal production.
The low wages, irregular working time, and loss of status led to
dissension within the union and caused much discontent among the wor-
kers. Many rival unions, like the National Miners Union, were formed.
In 1930. the district union officials of Illinois mines held a con-
vention at Springfield, Illinois, to reorganize the national union.
Out of this confusion The Progressive Mine Workers of America was
organized in September 1932. 'Its achievements have been inconsequen-
tiaJ.' and its agreements cover on~ a very small fraction of the total
(D)
bituminous coal miners~
(13) How Collective Bargaining Works, .212. ill., P. 267.
By 1932 the once powerful UMltl had become a skeleton. The Union
reported a membership of 300.000 but dues paying membership was prob-
ably half of that figure. In the meanwhile 'lmder left wing leadership
revolutionary tactics were employed by the miners who belonged to the
splitter unions and who were diss tisfied with the passive attitude
of the UMW. They sponsored a number of strikes J and to counteract
this violent labor upheaval the mine operators turned to the UM¥.
Labor in the industry as a whole was completely demoralized by the
(1) breakdown of the Jacksonville Agreement, (2) reopening on an open
shop basis, (3) increase of non-union operations, and (4) decline of
membership and funds.
Fisher, W. E., terms this period as the period of 'return of ruth-
(14)
less competition.' Union membership, activity, and strength was
indeed at a very low ebb. The percentage of the total tonnage of coal
(14) Fisher, W. E., Collective Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal
Industry, .21?,• .£it., P. 26.
produced under union contracts in 1933 was less than 20% instead of
72%, the proportion under the union negotiated contracts at t he height
of it 8 power. The 6ituation looked very black indeed for t he miners.
In 1933, a new administration took over in Washington, and organized
elabor came out of it s t slough of despondancy.1 For the first time union-
ism and the right to bargain collectively came under strong government
protection and encouragement. This new policy was not so much an in-
nov tion as a r evival and ~:tension of previously ennunciated principles.
4. 1933 to the Present t
Many operator s realized that the competit iva struggle in 1'hich
wage cuts follOl"1ed price reductions in a downward spiral was demoral-
izing. Both the miners and operators sought some other remedy to the
situation. The operators formed the Appalachian Coals, Inc., - an
organ of voluntary regional selling agencies. The union leaders be-
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came convinced that economic organization was inadequate to protect
workers in a decentralized, over eveloped industry in which many
employers fought unionism and refused to bargain when unions were
established. The union decided to work for the reintroduction of
(15)
the Davis - Kelly Coal Bill and for a federal law limiting hours
(15) This bUl, drafted with the collaboration of the miners l union,
was introduced in Congress in 1930 but failed to reach a vote.
The essential features of this bill was to encourage the organ-
ization of operators to regulate the market without interfer-
ence by the anti-trust laws, while guaranteeing to labor the
right of collective bargaining and enforcing both these meas-
ures by a licensing system.
-----------------------------.._----
to six-a-elay and thirty-a-week. The Congress on January 16, 1933,
passed the National Industrial Recovery Act which stated in explicit
terms in the famous section 7(a) Labor t s right in code industries to
organize ~thout employer interference and to bargain collectively.
This served as a 'catapult for rapid organization of labor.' Organ-
izers and volunteers scurried through the coal fieMs to carry the
news that the Government. guaranteed all workers the right to join
mions of their own choosing. Union membership grew by leaps and
bounds even in strong non-union areas. Six weeks after the passage
of t he~t the UMW claimed that their membership included more than
90% of the coal miners. Union officers and operators met and were
able to draft a code which provided for minimum prices, I=rohibited
certain unfair trade practices, and guaranteed the miners the right
to bargain cQllectively through their own unions, to select checkweigh-
men, to trade where they wished, and to live in other than company
houses. Many industrial disputes occurred art r the code became ef-
fective and thu characterized the stress am B trains which had to
be adjusted after years of chaos and disorganization. Once these
were settled production forged ahead.
The NIRA had helped Lewis to rebuild UMW and to achieve what
no other union in this industry had been able to accomplish - accep-
tance of collective bargaining by the great majority of 9)ut,hern
operators.
All went well until 1935 when falling prices made 0 rators Ull-
willing to negotiate contracts with wage increases. A general sus-
pension of work by the miners was postponed at the request of the
President. The SuprEme Court invalidated the NIRA in May 1935, and
the new Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was declared unconstitu-
tional on May 18, 1936. Convinced that some form of governmental
participation was necessary to insure collective bargaining in the
industry, the Union helped very ImJ.ch in getting the Bituminous Coal
(16)
Act of 1937 passed.
(16) This assured the riglTt of employees to bargain collectively.
non intervention of the employers, freedom of the worker to
join any association for collective bargaining. The act also
authorized cooperative marketing agencies. etc.
In March 1939, the miners asked for six-hour day and thirty-
hour week, a wage increase. vacation with payJ a guaranteed 200 work-
ing days per year, iJnproved recognition clauses, and certain improve...
menta in 'WOrking conditicns. The Appalachian operators insisted that
the prevailing .wage level was already too high for profitable oper-
ation and stocxi firm against further concessions. Reali3mg that
no wage increase could be obtained they insisted on a union shop
clause. After a peaceful one-day stoppage a two-year contract was
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secured. This was called the 'Appalachian Agreement' •
In 1940 the UMW celebrated its golden jubilee. This convention
proposed to replace regional contracts with a national agreement. It
also urged President Roosevelt , to call a conference to formulate
a conservative national program designed to cure the evil of unemploy-
ment' and it a sked for liberalization 6f the existing social legislatio~
Partial realization of one of these aims came in 1941 with the
abolition of wage differential. After much negotiation, strike, and
intervention of the National Defense Mediation Board, the southern
operators signed an agreement almost idential with the one northern
operators had accepted. In the fall of 1941, the UMW demanded that
the steel companies sign a union shop agreelD3nt. The companies re-
fused to. sign and the dispute .....rent to the National Def se Mediaticn
Board. The Board's eventual rejection of the Union's d and was fol-
lowed by a strike. Union victory finally csme on December 7, 1941,
when an arbitration board, created through the persuasion of Roose-
",eIt, ruled that the union shop should prevail in the capth"e mines.
By this time the United states was involved directly in the glo-
bal war. The miners and operators started negotiations on March 10,
1943, for the next agreement. No agreement "ras reached .and Secretary
of Labor Perkins announced on April 22" that Ebe had certified the
di pute to the National War Labor Board since coal is essential for
the prosecution of the war. 'Wildcat' strikes started thro hout the
entire industry. On May 1, the President signed an executive order
empowering Secretary of Interior Ickes to seize the mines l'Ih:ic h he
did that dBiY. The WLB issued a directive order on May 29, that tm
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demand for a general wage increase be denied. The union ignored this
order arrl production ceased on June 1. After int ermittent operation,
negotiation and strikes, the Government again seized the mire s on
November 17, 1943, and work was resumed.
The Ickes-Lewis Agreement signed December 17, 1943, effective up
to March 31, 1945, was the first portal-to-portal contract. It estab-
lished a workd8¥ of 8-:t hours for out side, sevEl1 hours of which were
paid for at the straight rate and 1 'fo hours at time and half. Northern
operators signed this contract on December 17, 1943, and southern oper-
ators on June 16, 1944. There was no general strike in 194.4.
Negotiations for a new agreement in 1945 'bogged down' and govern-
ment seized the mines April 10, 1945; terminated June 23, 1945. The
agreement was signed April 11, 1945, with termination indefinite. This
was called the National Bituminous Agreement of 1945. It carried for-
ward the t enns and conditions contained in all joint wage agreements
effective April 1, 1941, to March 31, 1943. It provided a workday of
nine hours from portal to portal including a staggered 15 minutes
lunch period for all inside employees.
As the result of t he efforts of the UMol to organize them, strikes
of supervisory and technical forces started in Pennsylvania and nor-
thern West Virginia during the week ending September 29, 1945. This
spread all over the industry and. closed most of the mines. The gov-
ernment int ervened and f :1na.lly on Octob er 17, Lewis ord rp.d the min-
ers to resume work on October 22, 1945. No oncessions were made.
The Krug-Le\ds Agreement si€1led on M~ 29, 1946, established a
welfare fund of five cents per ton, a mine saf ty program, and some
wage increases. The mines were :in government possession for a long
time. On October 21, 1946, the union requested a joint conference
and it was convened on November 1. On November 15, the UMW notified
that the contract would terminate November 20, 1946. On November
1946, Federal District Court Judge Goldsborough issued a temporary
restraining order against contract termination. Strike began on Nov-
ember 20. Lewis and the Union were found guilty of con\:, empt on Dec-
ember 2, and the UMW' was fined $3,500,000 and Lewis $10,000 on Dec-_
ember 5. Lewis ordered the miners to resume work on December 6, 1946.
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement made on July 7, 1947,
is famous for the clause Iduring such time as such men are able and
willing tor work.' The agreement of 1948 made on June 25, 1948, car-
ried fontard all agreements from April l~ 1941 to June 30, 1948, and
amended the 1947 agreement to increase the lfare fund to 20 cents
a ton and S0100 wage increases. The agreenent expired on June 30, 1949,
and from then on miners were working three days a week. s no con-
tract existed the southern operators declined to pay for the welfar
fund with the slogan Ino contract, no welfare fundI. Lewis retaliated
by advising a stoppage of work with the slogan 'no welfare fund, no
work t • This is the condition at the time of this writing.
It is evident how fast and strong the UMW has groltl under govem-
ment protecticn. It made rapid strides and by 1940, the entire bitum-
inous coal industry was completely unionized 100 per cent - the only
other comparable industry is the railroads.
The Government itself felt this and a vigorou attempt to curb
union power was undertaken by industrial leaders. This attempt. was
aimed in three dj.rections: (1.) An attempt was made to curb union pol-
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1c1e5 designed to limit output or to require the employment of un-
necessary union workers (Lea Act of 1946), (2) Aggressive action was
taken against so-called labor racketeering (Hobbs Anti-racketeering
Law of 1946), a.rrl (3) A drive for the amendment of the National Labor
Relations Act was begun to give employers rights as well as duti s,
and to give union leaders and \'1orkers duties a s well as rights (Taft(17)
Hartley Law of 1947).
(1'7) Bye, R. T., and Hewett, W. H., Applied. Economics. New York:
APpleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1947. P. 219.
(18)
The comments of Hoxie, R. F., on unionism seem to fit 11 with
(18) l-!cConne1l, D. W., AYres, A., Friedrich, A. A., Atkins, W. E., and
others, Economic Behaviour - An Institutional Approach. New
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939. P. 606.
the growth c£ the tJl.lW of America. He states that unionism 'aims chiefly
at more here and now for the organized workers of the craft, or indus-
try, in terms mainly of high wages, shorter hours, and better working
conditions regardless for the most part of the welfare of the workers
outside the particular organic group, and regardles in general of
political and social considera.tions, except in so fa.r as these bear
directly upon its own economic ends.... It regards unionism mainly
as a bargaining institution and seeks its end chiefly through co11ec-
tive bargaining, supported by such thods as experience from time to
time indicat 5 to be effective in sustain g and incre.asing its bar-
gaining power' •
An xamination of these qualitative traits of unionism and their
quantitative effect on the cost of coal leads us to the next section.
28.
Wa es and Othel' Fac:i~rs. and Cost
Wages. Wages paid to the miner for his labor is an important
factor in the cost of coal. Even as early as 1876 Iwages were as(1)
much as 80% of total costs l • Throughout it stood around 60 to
---_._----------------------,--
(1) How Collective Bargaining Works. .2.£. cit., p. 231.
(2)
70 percent and at present the cost is divided as follows:
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* Wages for all employees at mines (including supervisory)
Payroll ounts to 1,09l~ million dollars.
Unlike most of the oth ex' co st S J being fixed and small and beyond
the power of the producer to cl ange J wages played and still playa
prominent part. According to Marx, the law of wages is a coroLlary
of the law of value. Labor, like other goods J sells at a price equal
to its cost of production. The wage rate is determined by the cost
of necessit.ies requir ed to bring up the quota of children who are to
perpetu te the race of laborers. He said Igoods are exchanged for
each other in ratios 'Which measure the relative amounts of labor in-
corporated in them. Various exceptions are a.cknm'fledged, and it is
admitted that market prices m83' depart from norm of labor theory of
value. But on the whole it is labor cost, including in this concept
29.
a proportional part of the labor cost of providing c pital instru-
(3)
menta and raw materials used in production which controls value. t
(3) Fairchild, F. R., Furniss, E. S., and Buck, N.S., Elementary
Economics. New York: The McMillan Co., 1939. P. 620-721.
A atudy of the bituminous coal industry shows the stru e of the workers,
who, .consci usly or unconsciously try to chieve this and of the pro-
ducers to accumulate profits J which is opposed to the marxian princi-
plea Generally in the tmionized parts of the industry, in the twen-
ties and thirties, wages were high, an:l when the collectiva bargain-
ing machinery broke down, although prices were cut drastically, wages
astonishingly enough maintained an almost equal percentage of the tot 1
costs. After the passing of the NffiA the entire irrlustry was organized.
Wage differentials existed for a while between th~ North and the South
but they were eliminated.
The yearly increase in wages, (both in union and non-un'on e s),
is presented in tables l(a), and l(b). Most of the data for the e rs
before the Ooal Code of 1933 and especially for th non-union ar as
are I fra~entaryt • (4)
However, Fisher, after detailed study concluded that durin
(4) Fisher, W. E., Call ctiva Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal In-
dustry. ~.~. P. 5.
the period 1912 - 22 "it is apparent that the union \\Orkers received
substantially hi her rates of p~. At the beginning of this period
the differential between union and on-union rates was 11 cent per
hour. In 1920 the differential was reduced to about 9 cents, an:l the
average for the 11 year period was 13 cents per hour." These are in
the case of trackmen. In the case of ins ide day laborers the average
wage differential was 17.8 cents. When business fell drastically in
the depression of 1922, tmion rates continued at the 1921 level and
the non-union operators, because of their flexible wage policy, were
able to lower \'fages in many cases to about 30 to 40 cents. The pro-
cess continued lmti1 1933 when the NIRA was passed.
After this period wage information is clear (refer table l(b) ).
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TABLE l(a)
Rates of Pa Provided in Bituminous Joint Wa e A 2
S ~ Screen Coal (miner paid only for coal which would pass over a
screen with hole sizes indicated) •
M.R. .. Mine Run (miners paid for all coal mined).
Inside Hours Pick Mine Loading Basing ea
Year Day: Wage Per Day Per Ton Per Ton and District
S MaR S M.R.
1.75" 1.75 11
1892 2.00 10 $0.50 $0.38 Cent ra1 Field
1893 2.00 10 .50 .38 Hocking ValJ.ey,O
1894 1.75 10 .4271 .33 II II
1895 1.62 10 .3943 .305 " "1896 1.77 10 .4357 .335 II "
1896 1.80 9 .54 .25 Centra Fi d,Ind.
1897 1.65 10 .4D .31 " " , Pal1897 1.$0 9 .65 .39 .32 .19 Central Field ,I d.
1.25" 1.2511
1898 1.75 8 .66 .4266 .33 .2133 Central Fie1d,Pa.
1899 1.75 8 .66 .4266 .33 ,2133 II "
1900 2.10 8 .80 .3968 .2565 II "1901 2.10 8 .80 .3968 .2565 II II
1902 2.10 8 .80 .3968 ,,2565 II II
1903 2.56 8 .90 .4560 .2948 II II
1904 2.42 8 .85 .4264 .2756 II II
1905 2.42 8 .85 .426 .2756 If "1906 2.56 8 .90 .4560 .2948 " "1907 2.56 8 .90 .4560 .2948 If "
1908 2.56 8 .6429 ..5135 Central Field J :0 ..
1909 2.56 8 .6429 .5135 " "1910 2,70 8 .6785 .5470 II II
191 2.70 8 ,6785 .5470 II "
1912 2.84 8 .7143 .5850 II "
1913 2.84- S .7143 .5 50 II II
2. 4 .6760 .1-1) II "
19 5 2.84 8 .6760 .40 II It
1916 2.98 8 ,6764 ./+260 II II'
1917 3.60 8 .7764 .5110 II 11
1917 5.00 Nov. 8 .8764 .5960 II It
191 5.00 8 .8764 .5960 II 11
1919 5.70 8 .9864 .69 '1 "
1920 6.00 8 1.1164 .80 II II
1920 7.50 A g 8 1.1 64 .80 II "
Inside Hours Pick lUne Loading Basing Area
Year Day Wage Per Day Per Ton Per Ton and District
S M.R. S. M.R.
1921 $7.50 8 1.1164 .80 Central Field, O.
1922 7.50 8 1.1164 .80
"
11
1923 7.50 8 1.1164 .80
"
It.
1924 7.50 8 1.1164 .80 II II
1925 7.50 8 1.1164 .80
" "1926 7.50 8 1.1164 .80
"
If
1927-1 7.50 8 1.1164 .80 Ohio
1928 7.50 8 1.1164 .80 Illinois
1928 5.00 Sept 8 .fr164 .60 Ohio
1928 6.10 Sept 8 .fr1 to .91 .87 to 1.20 Illinois
1929 5.00 8 .8764 .60 Ohio
1929 6.10 8 .87 to .91 .87 to 1.20 Illinois
1930 6.10 8 .87 to .90 .87 to 1.20 II
1931 6.10 8 .87 to .90 .87 to 1.20 II'
1932 5.00 ug. 8 .64 to .68 .64 to .97 If
*From April 1, 1927 until Sept. 22, 1933, no basic
a eement existed. District agreements ..lere made
in Irxiiana and all states to t he west. 72 per cent
of Bituminous Coal production was non-union. Wages
were 1.25 to 2.84 for a nine or ten-hour d~.
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TABLE l(b)
Appalachi n and National Wage Agreements 1 1933-1949
dditiona1 Provisions




moved. $20.00 pd. v catio
Time & for 6th day.
1~ hourly rate for Sth hr.
$50,00 paid vacation.~orT.al to portal, time and
~ over 40-hour week
$75.00 paid vacation
Shift differential, time
and - over 35-hour week;
paid lunch period (15 min)
11.85 100.00 paid vacation
0.05/ton welfa.re fund
Federal Safety Code
13.05 Paid lunch period (30 min.)
O.lO/ton welfa.re fund,
time and ~ over 40-hr wk.
14.05 0.20/ton welfare fund
11.855-22-46 - 6-30-47 9P
(Krug - Lewi s)
7-1-47 - 6-30-48 SP
(National Bituminous Coal
Vi age Agre ement )
7-1-48 - 6-30-49 8P
Basic Day Wage
Effective Dates Hrs(Day Inside
North South
10-2-33 - 3-31-34 S1* $4.60 4.20
4-1-34 - 3-31-35 7F 5.00 4.60
10-1-35 - 3-31-37 7F 5.50 5.10
4-1-37 - 3-31-39 7F 6.00 5.60
5-12-39- 3-31-41 7F 6.00 5.60
4- 1-41- 3-31-43 7F 7.00 7.00
1-29-43- 3-31-43 7F 7.00 7.00
(supplemental)
6-18-43- 11- 2-43 8F 8.50 8.50
~ at'l. ar Labor Board~
ll- -43 - 3-31-45 9 ** 8.50 8.50
(Ickes - Lewis)
4-1-45 - 3-31-45 9P 10.00 10.00
(Nat iona1 Bituminous Coal
age Agreement )
* Face to Face
i.'-l<- Portal to Portal
Tables l(a.) and l(b) were derived from "Coal and Unionism",
Bituminous Coal, 1949 Edition, Bituminous Coal Data, 1935-1948, Wage
Chronology No.4, Bituminous Coal Mines, published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, and Labor Relations in Coal Mines by C. O'Neill.
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Hours and Da.Ys. The desirability of the shorter day as tested
by consideration of general moral and social welfare is nOi" granted
by mo st people. I f we I' eview the last seven decades we find that a
decline of about two ho~Sin the average day has been accompanied by
a rise of ,real wages for all groups of 'WOrkers; but this CaIlJ."'lot be
attributed mereJ,y to the shortening of the 'WOrk day, since other for-
ces, particularly the improvement of machinery t were operating to
increase labor l s productivity. This progressive reduction of hom'S
will have the incidental advantage of retarding the spread of tech-
(5)
nological unemployment. When the number of hours was reduced from
( 5) Fairchi.ld, F. R., et. al.... .£E. £21., p. 502.
eight to seven during the coal code regula'bion , it was found that
(1) the number of men employed per million tons produced fell to a
level consi erably beloll1 that which prevailed immediately preceding
the introduction of the se1ren hour day; (2) there was a sha.rp increase
in the number of mechanical loading devic~s (it is not possible to
say how much of the very rapid rise in mechanical loading was due to
the wage and hour adjustments and how much to other factors such as
the improved financial conditions t a more opti . stic attituie among
operators); (3) there as a gradual drop in man days worked P3r mil-
lion tOllS of coal mined; (4) there was a steady increase in the out-
put per man per d y; am (5) there was further material increases in
(6)
per capital income of full-time wage earners per 200 days worked.
(6) Fisher, W. ., Econa . c Consequences of the Seven-hour Day and
age Changes in the Bituminous Coal Industry. 2£. cit., P. 98.
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In most cases a9 time and half is d anded after the 40-hour
week and on the sjxth day of the week by the union contracts, work;i.ng
on the sixth dCo/ increases the cost of production of coal. Slifer,
W. L., after a study of 50 mines, concluded that the effect of idle
time in bituminous coal mining operations on the cost of producing a
ton of coal is as follows:




















Strikes, which frequently take plac at the end of agreements,
extract a heavy toll both from the miners and operators, iners lose
their PB\V and operators lose thei production and also maintenance
costs.
There seems to be a direct relation between shorter working hours
and degree of unionization in the industry. ''Why the secord and fourth
decades of the century should have been so much more productive of in-
crea.sed leisure for employed workers than the first and third decades
is by no means clear, Certainly the forces oper ting during the first
world war were very different from those present dl.ring the great de-
pression, But the result in both p3riods was increased unionization-
during the war because of the shortage of labor and the enhanced bar-
gaining power of the working force; during the depression because of
the governmental policies followed after 1933, To be sure it may be
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doubted, especially with reeard to the thirties how far labor union
action was responsible t in any a"{clusive sense, for the reduction in
hours that occurred. Partly mder the influence of a. movement to 'share
the work' there were numerous initiatives of a governmental or quasi-
governmental character which tended to shorten the workd8iY', notably
(7)
the NlRA and the 'wage and hour act' of 1928."
(7) Barger, H., am. Schurr t S. H., The Mining Industries. New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research Inc., 1944. p. 73.
In Table 2 is assembled data regarding weekly hours, earnings,
production, strikes, etc.
Better Working and tiring Conditions. There is a tendency in
union circles to justify any and all demands of labor with the remark
"there is too much blood in coal ll , thereby in:iicating the hazardous
conditions. Both the union and management strive to maintain safe
conditions. 'The improvement in safety is a result of the cooperation
(8)
of state and federal agencies, the producing companies, and labor.'
(8) Slifer, W. L., Personal communication.
Data regarding f tal and non-fatal injuries until the early thir-
ties are very sketchy and there is reason to assume the average in the
twenties for the rate per million man hours (fatal) to be 1 0 98. Data
for non-fatal injurie s is not available. The tate per million man tons
is 3055. As years progress there is a dist· net improvaJD:lnt in safety
conditions. (Please see Table 3).
TABIE 2
Number of Strikes and Number of Man Days Idle.
Production,
umber Annual No. of Aver. Weekly Aver. Weekly Aver. Prod. Tons per No. of No. of Man
Year of Men ~ Worked Hours Earnings Per :Han Day Man Hour Strikes Da..vs Idle
1935 462,403 179 26,4 $19.58 4.50 net tons .560 42 2,971,449
1936 477~204 199 28.8 22.71 4.62 .567 38 533,314
1937 491 ,864 193 27.9 23.84 4.69 .576 54 1,924,951
1938 441,333 162 23.5 20.80 4.89 .603 27 132,885
1939 421,788 178 27.1 23.88 5.25 .623 25 7,302,556
1940 439,075 202 28.1 24.71 5.19 .643 34 153,296
1941 456,981 216 31.1 30.86 5.20 .652 75 6,747,986
1942 461,991 246 32.9 35.02 5.12 .658 96 264,468
1943 416,007 264 36.6 41.62 5.38 .672 400 7,510,397
1944 393,347 278 43.4 51.27 5.67 .679 792 1,056,341
1945 383,000 261 42.3 52.25 5.78 .705 598 5,007,000
1946 396,434 224 41.6 58.03 6.30 .733 485 19,500 ,000
1947 419,182 234 40.6 66.86 6.42 .807 415 2,190 ,000
1948 438,000 210 38.0 72.57 6.50 .B30 561 9,560,000
(Derived from many tables from (1) Bituminous
Coal, Washington D. C. and (2) Bituminous Coal









































































(1) Subject to revi ion.
Source: U. S. Bureau of Mines.
(Derived from Table 103, Bituminous Coal Data)
It is difficult to ascertain the cost of maintaining safe condi-
tions in coal mines. The BllreaU of Mi.nes does not keep any record of
the cost to the min operators nor do they knOt{ of any other Federal
(9)
agency th.at maintain such records.
.39.
(9) Fene, W. J., Assistant Chief, Health and Safety Division, USIaM,
Personal Communication.
It cannot be refuted that the UMW had a great deal to do with the
improved safety conditions. The 1946 agreement embodied unusual fea-
tures related to safety in the mines and provisions for health and wel-
fare. In both of these areas the UMW took the initiative in strength-
ening or establis ing provisions commonly believed to be the r esponsi-
bility of the public thrcugh labor legislati on and oocial insurance.
A mine safety program was evolved and inclmed a Federal Mine Safety
code, to be issued by the Director of the USBM. The agreements gave
the Coal Mines Administrator power to take action against the operat-
ing manager, if oorrection of violation should be delayed. In a press
conference, citing figures based on a letter from the Director of USBM,
Lewis told that of the 172.3 mines inspected during July 29, 1946 and
March 25, 1947 only two mines had been found by °nspectors to be comply-
(10)
1.'1.g completely with Safety Code provisions.
(10) Wieck, E. A., The Miner t s Case and the Public Interest. 2£. ill,.
p • .37 - 44.
In the Health and Welfare program was iM1uied a welfare and re-
tiremant fund, and a medical and hospital fund, which will be used to
enable miners and their dependents and survivors to meet needs result-
ing from sicmess or temporary disability, for pennanent disability,
death, or retirement, or other related welfare purposes. Defending
(11»)
this program, Lewis anwlciated six reasons:
(ll) Lewis r Statement on Welfa.re Fund, New York Times, May 15, 1946.
-----------~-~~~~._~
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(1) To furnish adequate ar-d modern medical service to the coal
miners and their dependent families with a choice of physicians, which
in many areas, especially in the South t they do not now have.
(2) To give adequate hospitalization under proper standards.
(3) To provide insurance, for the miners '\'rhich they cannot pur-
chase. Life Insurance cost the miner about 277% of what it costs
people in sedentary occupations. Obviously he cannot purchase 1t at
that price. So he has no insurance t his family is unprotected in case
of reath by violence in the mines or from natural causes. The program
will provide insurance on a mass basis much more cheaply.
(4) To provide rehabilitation for the injured and disabled miners.
(5) To give economic aid in distress and hardship cases.
(6) To fumish cultural and educ at ion8ol work among the miners.
He concluded by sa;ying that 'the coal ind.~try mangled these people
(the miners) ani the Ul"1W want the right to alleviate their agony and
distr.ess.' He also pointed out that nearly every country in the world
has such funds for its mine wor"kers incluiing Englarrl, Spain, and India o
One more important provision is the holiday clause. From $20.00
paid vacation in 1941 the figure now stands at $100.00 for a two weeks
paid vacation for all mine workers.
~. Cost as here considered denot e the average value f .o.•b.




(c) other mine expenses




How the non-union South dominated the coal market before 1933 is
well illustrated in Table 4. In this t able Alabama, Kentucky, and
Termessee will be taken to be compared with three northern fields Ohio,
Illinois, and Pennsylvania. It is striking to note that when the \thole
industry was unionized and the wage differentials were removed the va1-
ue of coal in the southern fields has gone up very high.
Before the Coal Code, the southern areas, in order to remain in
busine S5, sold their coal in a competitive market without My prof it.
The troubled conditions were brought out by Taplin, F., President of
the Pittsburgh Terminal CO::11 Corpor,ation, in a letter dated June 27.
(12)
1931. "For the past four years these operators who have dispensed
(12) Bituminous Coal Code Hearings, August 10, 1933, Vol. 2., P. 2:78.
with union agreements have had plenty of tine to view the experience
of running without <I1y fixed wage scale or without l'Bving any labor
or ganizations to deal with the union. It must be adl'ldtted that the
situation is even worse than when we dealt with the Union. Many oper-
ators try to keep their properties operating by cutting prices to rid-
iculous figures, then go back and cut the wages of the miners, and this
continues till the level of miners has been brought down so low in
some places as to be a disgrace to the country. Personally I would
much prefer to deal with the ID-rw than with these ruthless price cutting,
wage cutting operators lobo are ad etriment to the industry. II
An examination of the net income of Corporations engaged in Bitum-
inous Coal Mining justifies this idea. After the NlRA and the complete
42.
TABLE 4
Avera.ge Value Per Ton on Bit. Coal F.O.B .. l-iine
U,S.
Year Alabama Kentucky Tennessee Q!!i2 Illinois ~ ~
*1920 $.3 .65 4.11 4.02 3.82 .3.08 .3.77 3.75
i:-19.30 2.0.3 1.49 1.64 1.40 1.74 1.77 1.70
-1'1935 2.15 1.62 1.80 1.66 1.56 1.88 1.77
1936 2.1.3 1.63 1.85 1.61 1.60 1.89 1.76
19.37 2.40 1.84 1.99 1.76 1.73 2.06 1.94
19.38 2.42 1.82 2.01 1.78 1.71 2.07 1.95
*19.39 2.30 1.74 1.95 1.6.3 1.64 2.03 1.84
1940 2•.3.3 1.85 2.00 1.71 1.69 2.04 1.91
1941 2.71 2.17 2•.34 1.99 1.81 2.28 2.19
1942 2.87 2.36 2.54 2.10 1.91 2.48 2.36
1943 .3.45 2.70 2.8.3 2.42 2.1.3 2.S2 2.69
1944 3.97 2.9.3 .3.26 2.65 2.2.3 .3.15 2.92
1945 4.19 .3.00 3.4.3 2.79 2•.34 .3.29 3.06
19l~6 4.81 .3.41 3 '8L~ 2.99 2.61 3.66 3.44
1947 5.48 4.42 4.77 .3.50 .3.15 4.2.3 4.16
1948 6.09 5.42 5.62 .3.96 .3 .66 4.96 4.95
*excludes selling costs.
Source: U. S. Bureau of Mines
Derived from Table 7.3 J 'Bituminous Coa11 , 1949
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unionization, the industry is recovering and it reported a profit
(13)
(after 18dera1 taxes) after 13 years.
illustrate:
Here are some figures to




• • • • • Profit of $18,329,750
1925 - 1939 • • • • • • Losses
1940.
·
• • • · .
·





• Profit of $19 t 239,OOO
1942. • •
· ·
• • • Profit of $31,129,000




1944. • • • • • •
·
• • Profit of $4.1 ,920.000
1945. • • • • · . • Profit of $31,228,0001946. • • • •
· ·
• • • Profit of $45,201,000
If allowance is made for changes in gEllera1 prices from 1890 to
the present, the real mine price (the prices which would be realized
if the general price level was constant) of coal fell slowly, reach-
ing its lowest level in 1916, started increasing am in 1945 was 89%
(14)
higher than in 1916. To offset the high labor co at which for over
(14) The Economics of Coal in the United States, The Economist, Lon-
don, September 7, 1946.
50 years has remained at about three-fifths of the realized mine price,
producers turned more and more towards mechanization. tBut the reduc-
tion in manual labor per ton has been more than offset by rising labor
costs. The real labor cost per roan-hour increased by 177% from 1917
to 1944 offsetting the reduction in manual labor per ton. Consequently
the real labor cost per ton has increased by 75%. The industry as a
whole, has turned over to labor more than the "Thole of tre advantage
(15)
arising from mechanization.
(15) The Economics of Coal. £e. cit.
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Other Conditions.
Compared to the United States, 'What is the value of coal in other
major coal producing countries and how effective is the unionization
(16)
of the industry? Hunt r, T. W., Chief, Coal Economics Branch J USBM.,
(12) Personal Communication.
--------------- ~ -. _. __ .__ .._--_.~-
writes: ''With the exception of a ~w countries, data on value of coal
at the mines in foreign countries are extremely sketchy and, to some
extent, unreliable. There is no doubt, considerable difference in the
present values and those prevailing in 1937. The recent devaluation
of currency in many countries has undoubtedly had sore effect on the
value of coal at the mines. Various report, indicate that mine wor-
ker t unions i.n the coal industries of Great Britain and France are
qtUte strong. Little info_ ation is available on coal miners unions
in other countries •••••••• , hcr.-Tever it can be assumed that they are
non-existent or 100 percent impotent in the countries behind the Iron
Curtain.. II
Table 5.
Country ~ Aver. Value /Ton U.S. Doll rs
Germany. •
· · · · ·





1937 145.11! d. 3.72
Great Britain.
• • • • • • 1947 395.5, d. 7.B5
Russia and Finland
• • • • n.a.
Poland
• • • • • • • • • •
1936 ll.67 Zloty 2.20
France
• • • • '. • ·
• • • 1937 119.33 Franc 4.B3Czechoslovaki$
• • • • • •
1937 98.92 KorumL 3.97
Fr~e 0 • • • • • • • • • 1945 512.63 Franc 10.10
Japan
• • • • • • • • • • n.a.India
• • • •
·
• • • .. • n.a•
n.a. Not available.
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Countg ~ Aver. Value on U,S, Dollars
U ited states , , , , 1937
--
1.94
United states . • • , 1947 4,16




'\".'hen the comparatively low standard of living in Europe is taken
into account, the value of coal seems to be higtl,
How does the co st of coal compare with the cost of other mineral
fuels?
Figures for 1948 reveal that Bituminous Coal value per million
B,T,Uts is 18,9 cents, Anthracite is 29.7 cents, Coke is 45.2 cents,
Natural Gas is 6 cents, and Crude Petroleum is 43.2 cents. Coal and
Coke are valued at .4.95 and $11,47 per ton respectively, Natural Gas
is 6.4 cents per thousand cubic feet. Crude Petroleum is 2,59 per
barrel.















































*Includes all family liv:ing essentials -
food, clot' g, etc, (1935-39 Average c 100)
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With all these factors it can be stated that at present "the
union lost nothing and gained everything, the proo.ucer lost something
and gained something else, but the consumer gained nothing and lost
almost every advantage," which is very different from the conditions
that existed in pre-complete unionization days -....hen only lithe consumer
benefited •••••• since the price for his coal was much lower than it
(17)
would otherwise have been."
(17) Fisher, W. E., Collective Bargaining in the Bituminous Coal In-
dustry. OPe cit •• P. 26.
Table 7, and the accompanying graphical chart has been compiled
to show th steep rise in labor earnings and the value of coal f.o.b.
Table 7
Earning by Labor for a Ton of Coal and F,OeB e Value of Coal
!222 Labor Earning/I'on ~ Value F.O.B, ~
1935 $ 1.16 100 1.77 100
1936 1.,22 105 1.76 100
1937 1.29 III 1.94 109.5
1938 1,27 109.5 1.95 110
1939 1 24 10 7 1.84 104
1940 1,20 103.5 1.91 108
1941 1.33 US 2.19 l24
1942 1.41 121.5 2.36 137
1943 1.49 128.0 2,69 152
1944 1.59 137 2.92 165
1945 1.64 141.5 3.06 173
1946 1.77 152.5 3.44 194
(1935 co 100)
Derived from Table 95 and 73, Bituminous Coal Data
and Table on Page no, Bituminous Coal - 1948 edition,
The triple threats to the coal miner are: (1) mechanization,
(2) competitive fuels, and (3) more efficient utilization. The UMW
must decide whether to seek a higher standard of living for a stead-
&lrning by Labor for a Ton of Coal







































ily declining number of workers or the economic well-being of all
employees attached to the industry. It has bargaining power to re-
duce wages, lower hours and probably to increase annual earnings.
In all likelihood such actio would encourage mechanization J more
efficient consumption, and great substitution of competing fuels -
all of which tend to more unemployment ani smaller payrolls. Effec-
tive handling of these economic conditions demands a higher order of
(1$)
industrial statesmanship.
(IS) How Collective Bargaining Works. op. cit., P. 277.
-------- - -- ....
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Effect of Unionism on Cost
liThe art of economics consists in looking not merely at the
i.mIr.ediate but at the longer effects of any policy; it consists in
tracing the consequen es of that policy not merely for one group(1)
but for all g r011ps •"
- .._---------- -----,
(1) Hazlitt, H. J Economics in One Lesson. New York: Pocket Books
Inc •• 1948. P. 5.
-_.._~~_.~--_.-
Most people in our society would probably agree and just'fy
'that industrial peace is preferable to industrial '-1arfare, that a
high at da.rd of living of our p~ople is better than a low one and
that freedom from government intervention is mare des'rable than
(2)
govel' ent control 'rlhich inte feres with individual in'tiative•
.-------------~,,--------
(2) Pollak, O. J Social Implications of Industry-wide Bargaining.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948. P. 3.
The disagreement arises only about the relativ weights to be attached
to these phenomena in their interrelation with each other.
The need for unionization was great in the coal industry. Being
very competitive in nature, with highly fluctuating profit an par-
tial unionization he had a natural desire to see the plant s of his
(3)
competitor also unionized so t at there may not be any competitive
(3) Fell r J A., and Hunwitz, J.H., HOH to Deal with Organized Labor.
New York: The Alex nd r Publishing Co., 1937. P.·l4l.
upsets. Complete unionization and consequent in list y-wide collective
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bargaining eliminated attack by the so-call d chiseling minority,
enforced effective inspection of working condit: ons in gene al by
stipulating the right of access to the place of employment by union
representatives.
In a highly competitive industry such as bituminous coal, con-
trol of trade practices through self regulation is almost impossible.
The union is a valuable police agency 'well worth its costs in terms
of wage and other concessions'; thus "re come to t he realization that
labor want industry wide collective bargaining for equalization of
labor conditions and employers want the same for protection against
competition in labor costs arrl for equalization of strength in nego-
tiations. So employers and employees have followed the method of
combination and self-limitation as the obvious way out of the trials
and tribulations of the competitive process. Cartels, trusts, and
gigantic business concentrations and the spectacular rise of unions
and union power are only dual expressions of the same trend. Hence
this method. of collective bargaining is not the accentuating factor
in the conflict between labor and capital. It may present, howe 1',
a serious item of social cost from the point of view of consumer
intere t.
The social gains and costs that attend complete unionization
(4)
are ably swmnarized by Pollak, Otto.
(4) ollak, 0.. .2l?. cit., p. 45 - 61.
Si ificant advantagos in tems of increased unity and social
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integration between e ployers and employees are (1) increase in the
area and degree of cooperation; (2) the promotion of recognition on
both sides, of their mutual interdependence and of the services which
they can render each other, can be seen in the policing system ~ich
unions can furnish employers in their fight against chiselers among
their ranks and in the regulation of competition in general; (3) the
increased share of labor in the tasks of lnanagement and their con-
sequent identification with the enterprise and a corresponding de-
crease of a purely antagonistic attitude on the part of labor against
management; (4) common fe~r of government intervention and the exper-
ience of success in exerting concerted pressure upon the government
in the interest of the welfare of the industry have been shown to
strengthen the recognition of mutual interdependence; (5) can help
in establishing collective planning.
The disadvantages are (1) the smergence of monopolistic combin-
ations between employers and employees with resulting price fixing
and restricted production; (2) limitations of free access to workers
and therefore an increase in unemployment; (3) unnecessary costs of
production; (4) a shift from. price competition to promotion competi-
tion and adverse affect on investment; (5) from the realization of a
common interest in limiting cut-throat competition, there is of course
only one step to the recognition of a COIIU'llon interest of capital and
labor in cartelization, at the expense of the consumer.
With this in the background, if' the conditions in the bitumin-
ous coal industry are 6XaJ • ned it is found that (1) costs and wages
were very bad in the pre- and partial-unionization days; (2) the em-
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ployers themselves wanted and strove for complete unionization;
(3) the strength of the UMW reached its peak with the aid and in-
tervention of government regulations and measures like NlRA, Nat-
tional War Labor Board; (4) the government in recent years fhighly
conscious of the political importance of the labor vote has been
influenced in its intervention', has employed the power of author-
ity to enforce settlement practically accepting the terms of the
union (coal strike of 1946); (5) the strategic skill and almost
hypnotic influence that John L. Lewis has had upon the fede al gov-
ernment; (6) spectacular gains were made in a period of war and
shortage of coal production; have all contributed to the power of
the t1M'l today.
True, the cost of coal has sky-rocketed today bu~ in contra-
distinction with the pre-union days the producers are not losing
money. They are making considerable profits. Thus although union
had a direct and adverse effect on the cost of coal the producers
do not suffer. It is the consumers who pay for the enjoyment am
entertainment of the producers and miners.
The industry being completely unionized, the employers find
it possible to pass on increased labor costs to the consumer and
thus have no interest in re isting wage demands too strenuously.
They avoid conflict and r each a mutually satisfactory arrangement
by passing on the costs to a thi party (the consumer).
(5)
It is thus prudent to wait and see whether Hazlittts theory
Hazlitt, H• .£E. cit., p. 133 - 134.
5.3 •
"that unions, do not, in the long run .and for the whole body of
1tlOrkers, increase real wages at allII and the consequent decrease
in cost of coal will prove true. Then the present high cost of
coal may be disregarded as a passing phenomenon.
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